Inter African Group Conference – Eritrean Congress Party

Written by Herui T Bairu
Tuesday, 09 September 2008 01:00

Inter Africa Group Conference9/9/2008 12:33:25 PM
This paper was written in the spirit of exchange of views regarding the security puzzle in our region. The seminar gave me the opportunity to emphasize that winds of peace are blowing from Asmara. It is the hope of the Eritrean people that the president of Eritrea would announce his willingness to negotiate with Ethiopia. We firmly believe that to negotiate is to avoid war; as to announce elections is to reconcile with the people.

While in Addis I had the privilege of being interviewed by WIC (Walta). In the interview there was a minor error that I wish to correct. Please read: The chairperson called upon the Eritrean people and the international community to support the Eritrean Congress Party (instead of the Eritrean Peoples Party) in its effort to bring about peace and security in that country.

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Inter Africa Group Conference (Addis Ababa, 1-2 September 2008

The Peace and Security Puzzle in the Horn of Africa

“Ethiopia-Eritrea Dispute and Somali Conflict”

By: Sally Healy

OBE, Associate fellow Africa programme

Institute for International Affairs

Discussant: Herui T. Bairu

Ladies and gentlemen I am honoured to be amidst such an illustrious company. For this I am grateful to the Inter Africa Group for inviting me to partake in this important conference. I am also honoured to be a discussant of the seminal paper presented by Sally Healy. The paper is thoughtful and inspiring: it is going to be an important point of reference for future debates regarding conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa.

The Descriptive Approach

My task as a discussant is not to criticize but to encourage a robust exchange of views with regard to the description of the issues raised, the conceptual framework presented, and the solutions proposed. I shall start with the descriptive part in order to check whether we have a common understanding of the narrative of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Even the conceptual framework shall be discussed from a descriptive perspective in case we encounter anomalies with regard the “Regional Security Complex” (RSC) as applied to the Horn.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict

The unionists in Eritrea were not exclusively of the Tigrinya community, nor were they exclusively Christian. Likewise, the independentists were not exclusively lowlanders or exclusively Muslim. The Tigrinya community was mainly represented by the Unionist Party; another part of that community advocated the establishment of an independent Tigrayan state; while a third part agitated for independence. The EPLF and the TPLF were allies during the struggle against Menghistu; yet, they were not motivated by ethnic considerations. We have to keep in mind that the EPLF and the TPLF were not state actors.

Psychological factors, whether at the individual leadership or community levels, were not the causes of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea; they merely inflamed it at the managerial level. Sally is right in pointing out that the Eritrean decision to issue its own currency (Nakfa) was the immediate cause of conflict. Such a radical action would have required pre-decision consultations with Ethiopia. The decision to issue the Nakfa blocked hopes of state association between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I assume good taste prevented Sally from mentioning the issue of Assab – regarded by experts of the region as the root cause of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

The border conflict was not caused by misconceptions regarding the colonial boundary. The colonial boundary was taken up because the Eritrean president generalized the local conflict of Badume into a war between two states; in this case, along the Eritrean Ethiopian colonial boundary.

Issayas did not fully grasp the significance of the resolution of the Ethiopian parliament; nor did he understand the seriousness of the Ethiopian Prime Minister. That is why he squandered strategic-time needed for the eventuality of war on diplomatic rounds. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, however, used his strategic-time to prepare the Ethiopian army for the possibility of war.

After the ceasefire Ethiopia and Eritrea should have negotiated face-to-face as a first step and legitimized the results of their agreement at the UN. Issayas did not listen to warnings that the Yemeni model of negotiation was something to be avoided. Ethiopia and Eritrea tied their hands by resorting to international arbitration as a first step. As for the matter of intervention in Somali affairs, Issayas supported the Islamic Courts primarily because it was diplomatically and financially profitable to do so in the form of access to the Middle East; the opportunity to challenge Ethiopia in Somalia was additional bonanza. Issayas did not develop new strategies as a result of the stalemate; his foreign policy is best described as that of the ‘bad boy in the neighbourhood’ rather than ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, as Sally depicts it.

Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict

Issayas’ involvement in Somalia did not start immediately after 1998: his active support of Islamic Courts and anti-Ethiopian government forces attained a threatening level around 2005. The argument that Ethiopia and Issayas are competing in Somalia needs to be qualified. The Ethiopian leader did not intervene in Somalia because it presented an immediate threat to the interests of Ethiopia or because it was a base for international terrorism; it is safe to assume that he intervened because the idea of Greater Somalia was reawakened by the Islamic courts. It was assumed that a Somalia founded upon ethnic unity, cemented by Islam, and the program of Greater Somalia, would not fail to claim Ogaden and provide an ideological bridge to the Arabic-Islamic world; it seems that Ethiopian intervention was intended to pre-empt such an eventuality. The presumed US financial, military, and diplomatic back up may have facilitated Ethiopia’s enterprise.

Regional Peace and Security Mechanisms

Sally’s view that the Algiers Agreement remains the appropriate framework for the resolution of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is faultless. It is clear that any attempt by the conflicting sides to achieve their goals by belligerent and illegal means would put them outside the reaches of the UN. It is, however, difficult to describe the Eritrean-Ethiopian stalemate as ‘no peace no war’; it is likely that it is going to be resolved by peaceful means. Close observation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict indicates that the chances of an all-out war are minimal. From the Ethiopian point of view, war may occur only if Issayas attempts to make border adjustments by military means. From Issayas point of view war may occur if he feels that his power is threatened internally with the support of external powers. The internal political and international diplomatic environments are not in favour of Issayas; the only path open to him is to break the deadlock by entering a phase of negotiations with Ethiopia.

The Conceptual Framework

The Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute did not cause the Somali conflict; as pointed out, Ethiopia and Eritrea intervened in Somalia for different reasons. Ethiopia is not in Somalia because Issayas is there; that fact merely provides added justification for designed intent. It is generally held that if the forces of Ethiopia and Issayas were to be withdrawn today, the civil war would be terminated in a relatively short period with the victory of the Islamic Courts. If such an eventuality occurs, Issayas’ relation with Somalia would be at a state-to-state-level. The unintended consequence of this scenario might feed the flames of war where Somalia and Eritrea may be ranged against Ethiopia.

With regards to the Sudan, Issayas terminated diplomatic relations with the Sudan in 1995; partly in order to meet American demands, under the guise that the fundamentalist regime in the Sudan was sponsoring Islamic Jihad in Eritrea. After the break Issayas supported the causes of Southern Sudan, the Bejas, and later Darfur. The Sudan, Yemen, and Ethiopia reacted by signing the Sana’a Agreement in 2002. The agreement was a friendship and cooperation arrangement between the three states, and solidarity with the Eritrean National Alliance (an umbrella organization for the Eritrean opposition forces). A couple of years later Issayas launched his programme of supporting anti-Ethiopian government forces: by 2005 Issays’ support to the Islamic Courts became obvious.

Regional Characteristics and Security Complex

The paper enumerates shared characteristics that define the Horn as a RSC. Sudanese governments, as opposed to the Sudanese people, never supported the Eritrean struggle for independence. In 1970, Nimeri supported the ELF, in order to extract an agreement from the Ethiopian emperor. After the Addis Agreement was signed Nimeri stopped all activities of the Eritrean revolution in the Sudan. Somalia provided passports and other soft facilities to Eritreans. Let us keep in mind that from 1963 to 1991 Eritrea was not a state player.

During the colonial period and the Second World War Ethiopia fought to maintain its independence: Ethiopia was at the receiving end of the global agenda. The Italian colonies, Eritrea and Somalia, were not in a position to partake in the global agenda. During the Cold war, Ethiopia under the emperor was an American client state; under the Derg it was transformed into a Soviet client. Somalia under Ziad Bare was a Soviet protégée until it was ditched for Ethiopia

The assumption of polarity between the Sudan and Ethiopia is not justified by the available evidence. We also lack evidence for the assumption that Ethiopia is a uni-pole. Ethiopia’s wars with Somalia and Eritrea have not been conducive to Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn of Africa. De-securitization and reorganization occurs after the defeat of given unit(s) by another set of unit(s), as in the case of the two world wars; examples are not lacking. Does such as situation obtain in the Horn? We need to keep in mind that the Horn of Africa is in many ways the sub-system of the Middle East: we can ignore this reality at our peril. Soliciting the support of the Middle Eastern region for the problems of Somalia and Eritrea can not fail to pay dividends. At the analytical level, it is hard to state that the relations between the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea have been governed by polarity or hegemony; the relations between the states of the Horn are governed more by our perceptions of national interest than our perceptions of amity and enmity. Difficulties arise because the states of the Horn region do not interpret ‘national interest’ to mean amity but rather the opposite.

The basic premise of Sally is that the Somali problem, more than the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, requires urgent attention. She proposes that the withdrawal of Ethiopian and Eritrean forces is essential for the resolution of the Somali conflict. Towards this end she envisions IGAD as the institution best suited to achieve three essential goals:

To encourage the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops
To bring Eritrea into IGAD’s fold, and
Supplement the efforts of the TFG with the UN, etc.

The fear is that these proposals may be too heavy for IGAD to tackle!

Permit me to add my own proposal:

Let the Horn region help establish a de facto Eritrean government-in-exile recognized by IGAD.

Thank you!

Herui T. Bairu