| Introductory Remarks The Pillars of Peoples Diplomacy Let us explore two aspects of people’s diplomacy in Eritrea. The internal aspect of people’s diplomacy is born from the desire of the Eritrean people to live together in unity and internal peace. The dynamics of this desire is expressed in the debate surrounding the draft constitution. The external aspect of people’s diplomacy emerges from the need to live in peace and cooperation with our neighbours. The internal aspect of people’s diplomacy can be resolved by establishing constitutional pluralism, while the external aspect focuses on partaking in a collective project of avoiding armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In a situation of extreme tension, where regular diplomatic channels have collapsed (as in the case of these two neighbours), the people may act, en masse in a demonstrative form or other forms of protest associated with social revolution – for the purpose of avoiding an impending catastrophe. When such a context obtains it can be said that the conditions for people’s diplomacy have attained relevance. 1. The Internal Aspect of People’s Diplomacy 1a. Unity of Vision and Vision of Unity Strategyadi represents a unity of vision on all central issues that are important for retrieving Eritrean rights and Eritrean nationhood. At the centre of these rights are the land and cultural questions. At the same time, the Strategyadi advocates a vision of unity that is represented in a constitution – ratified by an elected parliament. The Eritrean Congress Party appreciates the propagation of the principles that are etched in its program and the hearts of the Eritrean people: ‘Spread the Word but do not pilfer’! Is our motto. We take issue with parties that plagiarize our program without making reference to it. 1b. Weaving a Unity of Vision Strategyadi pointed out a fact that was not perceived by the post-federal generations for its significance to the task of weaving a unity of vision: “Modern Eritrean political and constitutional history confirms that the struggle for liberation was based on a national commitment to build an independent, sovereign, and unitary Eritrea. Every child knows that the Moslem League and the Unionist Party had diametrically opposed views on the question of the self-determination of Eritrea: the League advocated independence, while the Unionists pressed for union with Ethiopia. Not many are, however, familiar with the fact that these competing political forces concurred on the question of the indivisibility of Eritrea and the Eritrean people. The struggle for liberation was a continuation of the credo that the people, the land, the sea, air, and the state of Eritrea are indivisible. The blunders of the dictatorship, and the weaknesses of the draft constitution, do not justify the parceling out of the territory, resources, and institutions, of our country: the solution to the demands of “Biher”, religion, and language lies in political and constitutional adjustments based on our history. 1c. The Land Question as a Central Element of the Unity of Vision On the land question Strategyadi holds that an Eritrean constitution must include the following principles explicitly: · That land belongs to the Adis · That land shall be distributed among the inhabitants of the Adis for farming and residential purposes · The government’s role on the Land Question is limited to the correction of the injustices that haves been inflicted (by successive colonial powers and the PFDJ) upon large sectors of our population) 1d. The Cultural Question as a Key Component of the Unity of Vision Strategyadi states further: “Of the many weaknesses of the draft constitution, the confusion between the rights of the individual citizen versus nationality is the most serious. Democratic constitutions are based on individual citizenship; whereas, communist constitutions, such as the Chinese constitution, are based on the collective principles such as class and nationality. In democratic constitutions minorities are protected both as individuals and as groups. The draft constitution combines these irreconcilable constitutional traditions: the provision that the languages of national groups of Eritrea are not equal is a collectivist approach to constitution-making. This aspect of the draft constitution gave impetus to the distortions of the national question and internal federalism. 1e. The Draft Constitution as a Hurdle to the Vision of Unity Our Startegyadi expounded: “The draft constitution has been at the centre of the Eritrean democratic debate for two major reasons: the first reason is related to the question of participation in the process of constitution-making, while the second reason is associated with the inherent weaknesses of the constitution. There are certain national issues whose result is binding on us irrespective of our level of participation: a good illustration of this observation is the UN administered referendum that resulted in Eritrean independence and sovereignty. Not all the Eritrean liberation organisations participated in the referendum; nevertheless, all members of these liberation organisations welcomed the independence of the country for which they fought valiantly. Here, we are faced with the situation where, on the one hand, the opposition forces were not in a position to participate in the constitution-making process, while on the other, it may be argued that a large part of the Eritrean people participated, superficially, in that very process. In both cases the dictatorship’s aim was the marginalisation of the opposition forces from mainstream Eritrean politics; the tactics of the PFDJ notwithstanding, we remain entangled in this complex dilemma. Once again the indivisibility of the sovereignty of our people, and the continuity of the institutions of sovereignty, make it incumbent upon us to reject the draft constitution that was tailor-made for the Eritrean dictator. In fact, its, weaknesses are so glaring that even a drastic make-over by theinstrumentality of amendment would salvage it.” 1f. ‘Ratification’: a Hurdle to the Vision of Unity On the question of ratification the Strategyadi postulated: “The draft constitution was approved by the dictator’s assembly; to claim that it was ‘ratified’ amounts to accepting Issayas’s dictatorship as legitimate.” The Eritrean constitution was Issayas’ project and nobody else’s. He set the parameters and the objectives of the constitution as he also appointed the members of the commission. It may be added, that the posts that the members of the commission held were granted by Issayas. The commission for the drafting of the constitution did not include the instrumentalities of party and election laws; after all, the entire exercise was designed to adduce constitutional legitimacy on the person of the dictator. Asmara witnessed theatrical fan-fares surrounding the ‘ratification’ of the constitution; strangely enough, Issayas was weary of this game of make-believe: That is why the declaration of Election 2001 was, subsequently, accompanied by party and election laws. By this act the dictator admitted that the draft constitution was approved but not ratified; far more seriously, he also admitted (by his action) that a document without stipulations that regulate party building and democratic elections could not be considered a full-fledged constitution. 2. The External Aspect of Peoples Diplomacy 2a. People’s Diplomacy as a Fire Escape Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian and Eritrean states? Judging by the history of conflict between these neighbours a claim of this magnitude can hardly be made. Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian state and the Eritrean opposition? No. Such a relationship would assume that the Eritrean opposition has attained international recognition. Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian ruling party and the Eritrean opposition? No. The relationship between a ruling party and opposition forces is often based upon good behaviour and utility. Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian and Eritrean people? Yes! Even in a situation of war, we assert that there is a strategic relationship between these two fraternal peoples – despite temporary disturbances in their relationship. People’s diplomacy can contribute to the stabilization of political tremors as it can normalize abnormal relations. It can also be safely asserted that in circumstances where there is good will between these two neighbourly peoples the possibility of fostering strategic relation between their respective states may be available in the future. 2b. The Eritrean View of the Conflict The Eritrean regime sees the conflict as a matter of accepting the decisions of the border commission, and marking the international border between the two neighbors on the ground. 2c. The Ethiopian View of the Conflict The Ethiopian government sees the conflict as matter of sovereignty and requires that certain adjustments be made to the decisions of the border commission – via negotiations – in order to remove the causes of future tensions. 2d. International Arbitration Versus Face- to-Face Negotiations The boundary question took its present form because both Eritrea and Ethiopia decided to submit the border dispute to international arbitration. An alternative course could have been eyeball-to-eyeball negotiations between these two neighbors. An agreement reached via this diplomatic method could have been presented to the relevant UN bodies for international legitimation. This type of negotiation, if successful, is known to lead to a reasonably stable peace, while decisions reached by international bodies tend to lead to the argument: “you accepted the conditions of the game willingly, now you need to accept the results”. The border issue has been resolved by the international commission; yet, Eritrea and Ethiopia are still rearing to go at each other’s throat. Let us consider the official versions of the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments: The peace plan of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi, rejects war in favor of negotiations, and accepts the decisions of the Border Commission – in principle – leading to mutual corrections of sticky issues. 3. Identifying Sticky Issues 3a. Ethiopian Sticky Issues Ethiopian proposal focuses on some territorial adjustments in the Badume and Ali Tena areas in exchange of the Tsorona locality. 3b. Eritrean Sticky Issues From the territorial adjustment point view, the military implication of Ali Tena to the canyon and sea-port of Arefaile, and subsequently, the sovereignty of Eritrea is a sticky issue that requires a thoughtful approach. There are also developmental sticky issues in the Denkalia region that have been resolved in favour of Ethiopia. The first of these is an agricultural region that is central to the food security of the inhabitants of Beda; the second is a salt production area that is essential to the cash economy of Denkalia. 3c. Negotiations Now The proponents of people’s diplomacy call for immediate negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Negotiations are inevitable one way or the other. The Eritrean government holds the untenable position that the demarcation of the border is merely a technical issue that does not require a political summit between the leaders of both countries. It is important to keep in mind the fact that the border commission tribunal did not work out the rules that govern the implementation process. The implementation process requires detailed political and technical agreements regarding troop withdrawals, de-escalation, and other related matters. Drawing the international border on the ground is not solely a technical matter – it is primarily a political matter. The Eritrean regime needs to grasp that political negotiation sets the conditions for the consummation of the technical aspects of the border decision. This means that the two countries must negotiate in order to discuss the implementation annex and international legitimacy issues. The question is: should the Eritrean regime negotiate before war breaks and by, so doing, gain the peace, or wait for war to break out and repeat the US/Rwanda catastrophe? The president of the Eritrean regime must negotiate now! 3d. Negotiations Pay The next task, directly related to the question of implementation, is the important matter of ratification. The implementation of the decisions of the border commission needs to be complemented by ratification on the part of the parliaments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the case of Eritrea, only an elected Eritrean parliament can ratify the international decisions of the border commission. This means that there must be democratic elections now! Fellow Eritreans, in this new phase our duty is to agitate around the slogan of “Negotiations Now for the implementation of the border decision!” Herui Tedla Bairu 2007-04- 27/ Stockholm Copyright © 2020 Eritrean Congress Party Strategy Adi. All Rights Reserved. |