STATE OF ERITREA A PAPER ON HOW TO MEET THE PRESENT CHALLENGES

In a war situation a military upper hand is the ultimate basis for successful diplomacy. To concede military advantages in order to gain some diplomatic lever is regarded as high risk due to the perfidious nature of international politics. The collapse of the bipolar system and the balance of terror that accompanied it has not yet led to a restructured balance of power capable of replacing the previous international order. The UN, which was instituted to reflect the bipolar international structure that emerged after the Second World War, is not the same thing any longer: It appears to be unduly influenced by US policies. There are indications that international relations will be based on a structure of geopolitically significant regions that are intended to reflect American global interests. Ethiopia is such a candidate.       The present negotiation stance of the Ethiopian government is founded on the conviction that it has attained the support of the US to the status of regional power in the Horn. The OAU and the UN hoodwinked us into withdrawing from our entrenched, forward, positions so that Ethiopia could register a surprise victory; for this reason, Ethiopia is negotiating on the assumption that it is the victor. The negotiating goal of Ethiopia is to achieve victory on the negotiating table by imposing a peace that would transform our country into a non-sovereign, economically non-viable territory.   The leaders of the Ethiopian government and their backers are trying their level best to pressure the Eritrea government to abandon the principle of colonial boundary in favour of arbitration. Such a solution is expected to be the first step in forcing Eritrea to accept some kind of Ethiopian presence in Assab and its environs. Such a solution would be the death of Eritrea. In the event of Eritrean intransigence, this ruse shall be used to buy time for yet another attempt to capture Assab. How do we meet the new situation?   We have to send unmistakable signals to the international community and their facilitators that we shall not yield on the question of colonial boundary. That no consideration, be it political power or the urgency of wrapping up of the conflict, can make Eritreans give up their independence. Too much has been paid for that; we refuse to be degraded into another Somaliland (Hargesa). In inter state wars the negotiating technique often pursued is: wear down the contestant by constantly changing negotiating positions, and by putting impossible conditions in order to show the opposite side in a bad light. Ethiopia and her friends are playing this game skilfully against us; we have to put an end to it. What really worries the international community is the failure of the peace process, and the failure of the Ethiopian army to conquer Assab.   The time factor is far more important to the Ethiopians than it is to us; the longer the war drags on, the more the traditional instability factors in Ethiopia are likely to be at play. Victory, for both sides of the conflict, shall be determined at the Assab front. An important point that needs to be emphasised is the proper utilisation of the genius and creativity of the Eritrean people. So far, Eritreans have accepted the heroic role of being the source of manpower and funds; the Eritrean people should now be given the freedom to mobilise its collective wisdom in all areas that permeate the question of national survival.   The projection of our image to world public opinion is lacking; unless this question is resolved speedily our efforts to raise funds for our dispersed masses will be met by deaf ears. In this regard the problem of image is related to democracy; the projection of a democratic image cannot wait for the conclusion of the war; it is too important a weapon for winning the war to be neglected. Our strategy for the new situation should be: 3   – To ascertain, by all the means available to us, that the international community understands properly the determination of Eritreans to fight for the preservation of their independence and sovereignty.   – To strengthen the Eritrean army so that Ethiopia would never able to capture Assab under any circumstance.   – To form close relations with our old friends in the Middle East.   – To launch a national debate on democracy, so that Eritreans become active participants in determining their destiny, as they are the national source of manpower and funding.     HERUI T. BAIRU STOCKHOLM/13-07-00   Copyright © 2020 Eritrean Congress Party Strategy Adi. All Rights Reserved.